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1 Introduction 
Over the last decade, with the increase of electronic 
materials in healthcare and the improvement of network and 
information system, ‘electronic health records’ have become 
increasingly common and widespread to replace the 
traditional paper based-record (Lillian, 2008; Rengamani et 
al., 2010). However, making the information available 
electronically poses new security concerns especially when 
sharing them between different healthcare institutions where 
control of usage is required. Health records are important in 
the course of treatment process for the proper continuing 
care for patient and in most countries, they are considered as 
sensitive private data and they require special protection 
when using them. 
For example, the privacy legislations in Europe, USA or 
Canada clearly mention that ‘health records’ are considered 
as sensitive private data and their processing are bounded to 
the specific ‘purpose’ and excessive use of them is  
prohibited. With this regard, any processing environment 
dealing with such data requires great attention to make sure 
that system can provide adequate data processing security 
aligning with privacy legislation. The need of limiting the 
usage of data within the allowed ‘purpose’ leads to the need 
of effective management of purpose binding of data 
(including the recognition of purpose binding data) and 
enforcement. In general, there are two main parts for 
purpose enforcement. 
1 First, ‘verification’, a process to prove that claimed 
purpose exists for given requested object and action. 
2 Second, ‘validation’ refers to a process to prove that the 
claimed purpose is valid at the time of usage. For 
example, if physician claims ‘heart-surgery’ as purpose 
of using patient health record, then, ‘validation’ means 
to prove that physician does have the right to use data 
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for ‘heart-surgery’, requested purpose can be achieved 
after usage permission is granted, and physician cannot 
use patient’s record beyond the authorised purpose. 
Validating purpose of action is the main difficulty in 
purpose enforcement. Some common proposed mechanisms 
for purpose management and enforcement are: self-
declaration, in which the agent explicitly announces the 
purpose of data usage (Byun et al., 2005), and role-based 
enforcement (Jawad et al., 2008b), in which the purpose is 
identified based on the agent’s role in the system. The first 
method obviously cannot stop malicious agent from 
claiming false purposes. This is because anyone can claim 
any purpose of usage, without the proper system to validate 
claimed purpose; this method cannot be used in data 
processing environment like distributed healthcare (Rath 
and Colin, 2012a; Rath and Colin, 2012b; Jafari et al., 
2011). The second method has been criticised to be 
inefficient in capturing the purpose of an action since roles 
and purposes are not always aligned and members of the 
same organisational role may practice different purposes in 
their actions. Therefore, validating the claimed purpose 
remains an open question. 
This paper addresses three main issues: (a) propose 
purpose enforcement structure, (b) propose the design of 
purpose validation for the three validation phases (pre-, 
ongoing-, and post-enforcement) for distributed healthcare; 
and (c) implement the proposed model in a Java program, as 
the validation for our proposed model. It is worth noting 
that in this paper, we focus on usage control, more 
importantly, the enforcement of privacy-aware usage policy. 
In order to make a clear distinction between access and 
usage control, we provide the brief definitions as following. 
 Access control (Ferraiolo et al., 2001) is to selectively 
determine who can access services or resources and 
what type of permission is provided exactly. Access 
control prevents unauthorised access to the resources of 
system and they are implemented as a result of certain 
access control requirements, which are generally in line 
with the institutions policies. 
 Usage control (Alexander et al., 2008) refers to what 
should and should not happen to data item once it is 
granted access. Usage control is generally a controlling 
process at client side where data reside after usage 
permission is granted. When users request data from 
data provider, they might have to commit themselves to 
an access and usage control policy that reflects the data 
provider or owner’s interest. In general, access policy is 
applied at the time when users initiate request to data at 
server side and usage policy is applied at client when 
users start to process data at client-side control domain 
(Alexander et al., 2006). 
The dedicated usage control mechanism/technique can give 
the data owner a sufficient amount of control over what data 
consumer can do when the data are out of the controlling 
environment of the server side control domain. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 
presents the motivation and related work. Section 3 discuses 
about the purpose model and its enforcement structure. A 
purpose enforcement model for usage control is presented in 
Section 4 and a prototype of the proposed model in Section 5. 
The discussion on the perspective concerning purpose 
enforcement and the future research direction is presented in 
Section 6. Section 7 gives the conclusion. 
2 Motivation and related work 
Securing the processing of private data in distributed 
environment has been the subject of intense research, given 
the rise of social network and e-health systems. Many 
researches have contributed to this aspect ranging from 
access control, usage control, usage policy expression 
languages, secure communication protocol, and 
enforcement of usage policy (Li and Hoang, 2009; Russello 
et al., 2008; Lillian, 2008; yarmand et al., 2008). Among 
them, enforcing the privacy-aware usage policy is the main 
challenge, given the fact that, in distributed environment, 
the direct control on data is not possible. Thus, it is hard to 
ensure that remote client processes data as stipulated in 
usage policy without proper controlling technique. 
Jafari et al. (2011) defined a semantic model for 
purpose, based on which purpose-based privacy policies can 
be expressed and enforced in a business system. The model 
is based on the intuition that the purpose of an action is 
determined by its position among other inter-related actions. 
Actions and their relationships can be modelled in the form 
of an action graph. A modal logic and model checking 
algorithm are developed for formal expression of purpose-
based policies and for verifying whether a particular system 
complies with them. 
Rath and Colin (2013a) defined the access and usage 
control requirements for a particular healthcare information 
system where patients have pivotal right to grant or deny 
access to their health records. Authors named this system 
‘Patient Controlled Record type of Healthcare Information 
System or PCRHIS’. They also identified different types of 
users who are responsible for processing patient’s record. 
Rath and Colin (2013b) also purpose a model for e-health 
system. They classified purpose in different categories and 
defined the relationship between them. The usage 
enforcement engine is also proposed to support the model. 
Byun et al. (2005) and Ni et al. (2010) proposed a 
purpose-based access control model of complex data for 
privacy protection, a model that relies on the well-known 
RBAC (Ferraiolo et al., 2001) access control model as well 
as the notion of conditional role which is based on the 
concept of role attribute and system attribute. In their paper, 
they also provided a general purpose tree applied in 
complex data management system and a solution to address 
the problem of how to determine the purpose for which 
certain data are accessed by a given user. 
Concerning usage enforcement, Katt et al. (2008) 
proposed the extension of UCONabc (Park and Sandhu, 
2002) with continuous control usage sessions for expressing 
the ongoing-check obligation. They also proposed the  
general, continuity-enhanced policy enforcement engine for 
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usage control applied particularly to obligation. After the 
thorough study on the work of Katt et al., we found that the 
model can be extended and used to enforce the ongoing-
enforcement of purpose. 
Jawad et al. (2008a) proposed the formalised and enforced 
purpose restrictions in privacy policies based on planning. 
They modelled planning using a modified version of Markov 
Decision Processes (MDPs). They argued that an action is for a 
purpose if and only if the action is part of a plan for optimising 
the satisfaction of that purpose under the MDP model. Authors 
used this formalisation to define when a sequence of actions is 
only or not for a purpose. With this semantics, authors created 
and implemented an algorithm for auditing it. 
Another method is based on workflow like the one 
proposed by Jafari et al. (2009), Russello et al. (2008) and 
Zhang et al. (2005); they proposed an approach to enforce 
purpose using workflows, and encoded purposes as 
properties of workflows used in organisations. However, the 
proposed model does not work with ‘purpose’ that does  
not have a natural interpretation in terms of workflows, 
particularly, more abstract purposes. 
3 Purpose model and its enforcement structure 
Purpose of usage is one of the core concepts in privacy 
which considers user’s intent as a factor in making usage 
control decisions. In dictionary, ‘purpose’ is defined as ’the  
 
object towards which one strives or for which something 
exists; an aim or a goal’. However, observing how purpose 
is used in the natural language reveals that purposes often 
refer to a set of abstract actions. For example, accessing 
patient’s health record for the purpose of treatment, 
research, insurance, etc., all of which are names of some 
abstract actions. Jafari et al. (2011) classified ‘purpose’ in 
two types: purpose as high-level action and purpose as 
future action. 
Purpose as a high-level action refers to a more abstract 
or semantically higher level action in a plan. Thus, doing 
something for some purposes, actually means doing it as a 
part, or a sub-action, for that higher level action. For 
example, when Bob checks some patient’s blood pressure 
for the purpose of heart surgery, it means that checking the 
blood pressure is a part of a more complex and abstract 
action of heart surgery. As presented in Figure 1, the 
abstract action ‘purpose’ (a) is considered as the high-level 
action of ‘(b)–(v)’. 
Purpose as a future action is used to indicate that an 
action is performed as a prerequisite of another action in 
future. For example, in Figure 1, when a doctor does the 
‘surgery preparation’ for a purpose of ‘operation’, it means 
the former action ‘surgery preparation’ is done as a 
prerequisite to performing the later action which is 
‘operation’. In Figure 1 ‘(e)(g)(q)(t)(v)’ are considered to be 
the future action of ‘(d)(f)(o)(s)(u)’, respectively. 
Figure 1 Example of purpose graph in healthcare where dashed arrows represent purpose as ‘future action’ and solid arrows represent 
‘purpose’ as ‘high level action’. They are read from bottom up for solid arrows (e.g. ‘surgery preparation’ is a high-level action 
of ‘check heart treatment history’). Dashed arrows are read from left to right (e.g. ‘operation’ is a future action of ‘surgery 
preparation’) (see online version for colours) 
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Overall, to enforce the purpose means to verify that those 
abstract actions exist and they are valid during the usage of 
data. But the question is when and how the purpose should 
be enforced during the lifecycle of data usage. 
Observing how data are processed in the real world 
reveals that there are three crucial states that need to be 
considered for the enforcement of purpose: before usage 
permission is granted, during the usage of data, and after 
using it. We name the three enforcement states as: pre-, 
ongoing-, and post-enforcement. 
 Pre-enforcement refers to a mechanism allowing 
system to validate the purpose before granting usage 
permission to data. At this stage, the user’s request in 
which the purpose of usage is mentioned is validated by 
the system. If the system finds that the claimed purpose 
is not valid, it rejects request immediately without 
going further into the details evaluation of usage policy. 
For example, in emergency case for heart-surgery 
purpose, if doctor declares that purpose and system 
cannot prove the existence of ‘emergency heart-
surgery’, then the request is rejected. 
 Ongoing-enforcement refers to a mechanism allowing 
system to continuously control purpose of usage during 
the usage period. It checks if the actions performed and 
the requesting actions comply with the claimed 
purpose. During the usage, the system periodically 
triggers the re-evaluation of purpose. This intends to 
check if the purpose of usage is still valid given the 
change of time or state. Ongoing-enforcement can be 
called ‘controlling and guiding method’ because it acts 
as a controller and also a guide for user. It tells the user 
which action is allowed for which purpose. 
 Post-enforcement refers to a mechanism allowing 
system to validate the processing of data and to identify 
if the usage of data was in line with the claimed 
purpose or otherwise. This enforcement is done after 
the usage of data. It provides a way to prove the 
correctness of the data usage by means of the log 
information. Auditing mechanisms are required to 
analyse the log information and to reconstruct the 
execution process in order to find out if violation 
happened or not. 
With the above consideration, we see that to ensure the 
correctness of data usage, the purpose validation in those 
three states must be maintained. To support this 
enforcement structure, we propose the purpose validation 
information model as following. We define purpose as a 
tuple of PV (Purpose Validation) that consists of four 
elements as following. 
PV = F(CP, EP, T, VM) 
where 
 ‘CP’ is a claimed purpose of data usage. 
 ‘EP’ is an enforcement phase, it tells when the purpose 
should be checked, it can be ‘pre-enforcement, 
ongoing-enforcement, or post-enforcement’. 
 ‘T’ is used for ongoing-enforcement and post-
enforcement. When it is used in ongoing-enforcement, 
‘T’ refers to the time period for re-validating purpose. 
For example, during the emergency treatment session, 
re-validating purpose every 30 minutes. In case of post-
enforcement, ‘T’ refers to a time at which the purpose 
validation takes place after the data usage is ended. For 
example, re-validating the purpose of usage after two 
days of data usage. 
 ‘VM’ is validation mechanism which describes the 
mechanism used to check the validity of claimed purpose. 
In general, these four information elements are attached to 
data and they are sent to the remote client. With the 
provided information, remote client configures its system 
and validates purpose accordingly. 
For example, PV = (‘heart-surgery’, ‘pre-enforcement’, 
‘N/A’, ‘role-based purpose enforcement’) expresses that any 
request with the purpose of ‘heart-surgery’ should be pre-
enforced by using the ‘role-based enforcement’ mechanism. 
For more detail on purpose enforcement information model, 
one can refer to Section 5. 
To support this enforcement structure, we propose the 
enforcement model as presented in next section. 
4 Purpose enforcement model for usage control 
In this section, we present in detail the purpose-based usage 
enforcement model applied in distributed healthcare 
information system. The enforcement model focuses on the 
system architecture and functional modules to illustrate how 
the enforcement can be achieved. 
As illustrated in Figure 2, the model consists of many 
components; we divide it into four main parts: the main 
components for usage control enforcement and modules for 
pre-, ongoing-, and post-enforcement. We present them in 
detail as following. 
4.1 Main usage enforcement module 
This module consists of three main components: 
Enforcement Point (EP), Decision Point (DP), and Session 
Management Point. 
1 EP handles the request from the subject and forwards it 
to purpose validation point (for pre-enforcement) and 
then to decision point through session management 
point for further policy evaluation. If the usage request 
is granted by DP, then EP allows the subject to use 
resource, else, a denied message is sent to subject. 
2 SMP manages individual usage session. This includes 
requesting required decision(s) from concerning 
modules (ADF, OPE and PPE) in each state during the 
usage session. When usage request is received, EP 
forwards it to SMP. SMP sends corresponding decision 
requests to DP. Then DP launches a checking process 
for all the concerned modules such as ADF, OPE, and 
PPE. If all the requirements are fulfilled, DP sends 
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granting message to SMP. Then, SMP forwards it to 
EP. In case of negative decision, SMP sends a denied 
response to EP. In the using state, the SMP monitors 
continuously related subject, object and environment 
attributes; as well as any further actions requested by 
the subject. According to the decision received from 
DP, SMP either revokes the ongoing usage by sending 
a revoked response to EP or keeps permitting access. 
3 DP is responsible for making the permission decisions 
during usage control session based on usage policy. It 
consists of three decision-making components. 
 Attribute Decision Function (ADF) handles the 
attribute-based access decision during usage session. 
Attributes can be either subject, object, or environment 
attributes (e.g. the subject’s identification). The 
Information required by ADF is retrieved from DNI. 
 Ongoing Purpose Enforcement (OPE) handles the re-
evaluation of purpose during the usage of data. If the 
purpose is no longer valid, it informs DP to invoke the 
right and DP sends the order to end usage session to 
SMP. 
 Post Purpose Enforcement (PPE) handles the evaluation 
of purpose in case pre- and ongoing-enforcements are 
not possible. The decision of this module is based on 
the usage history and purpose graph (the graph showing 
the relationship between purposes). If after data usage, 
the PPE finds that user violates the usage policy, the 
right to use data is revoked and the future usage is 
prohibited. It is important to note that the post-
enforcement can be performed instantly after the usage 
of data or after a given period depending on the usage 
purpose enforcement information. 
Figure 2 Purpose-based usage control enforcement model. User and subject are interchangeable, it refers to those who request to use data 
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4.2 Pre-enforcement module 
Pre-enforcement module is responsible for validating the 
claimed purpose before granting access to user. This module 
consists of a purpose validation point connected to purpose 
validation mechanism and purpose enforcement information 
module. 
1 Purpose Validation Point (PVP) makes the decision 
whether a purpose is valid or not. Whenever there is a 
request, PVP checks the request based on the claimed 
purpose. To validate the usage purpose, PVP contacts 
the purpose validation mechanism (Figure 2). 
2 Purpose validation mechanism is responsible for 
validating the purpose of usage by using different 
validation mechanisms. The mechanisms used depend on 
type of purpose. Below are some examples of purpose 
validation mechanism. We divided the mechanisms into 
two types: general mechanisms that can be used not only 
for healthcare domain, but also for other domain-specific 
mechanisms that are designed for only healthcare system. 
General mechanisms 
 ‘Role to purpose alignment’ provides the information 
concerning the alignment between the user’s role and 
the purpose of usage. For example, a user in role of 
‘cardiologist’ may be aligned to the ‘heart surgery 
purpose’. This information can be used for the pre-
enforcement of purpose. However, using the role to 
purpose alignment alone may not be an effective 
solution to the problem as roles and purposes are not 
always aligned. Thus, this information needs to be used 
in conjunction with other information from other 
modules presented below. 
 ‘Action to purpose alignment’ provides the information 
concerning the alignment between the actions on object 
and the purpose. However, like ‘role to purpose’, 
‘action to purpose’ can be used only as the complement 
to other modules for purpose enforcement. 
 ‘Data to purpose alignment’ provides the information 
concerning the alignment between type of object 
(resource or data) and purpose. For example, data 
concerning surgery may be aligned to the request for 
‘surgery purpose’. 
 ‘Consent/authorisation’ provides the information about 
who is particularly authorised for which purposes. This 
module is administrated by the trusted entity that has 
the authority to align a particular user or a group of 
users to the particular purposes. 
Specific mechanisms 
 ‘Medical treatment registration’, in general, patient 
needs to register for the medical check. The registration 
information can be used to prove if the purpose claimed 
by the user is inline with the treatment of the patient.  
 
 
For instance, if the patient registered for general normal 
medical check, the users (e.g. doctor or physician) 
claimed purpose as ‘emergency’ is not valid. 
 ‘Room reservation (operation room or emergency 
room)’ provides the information concerning the room 
reservation for each operation. This module is designed 
as the source of information in case of emergency 
situation. For example, in case of emergency situation, 
the usage rule on data may be bypassed; hence, 
operation room reservation can be the source of 
information to validate the claimed-purpose. 
3 Purpose enforcement information (or purpose 
validation policy) provides the necessary information 
like, how the purpose should be validated with which 
mechanisms and at which phase of data usage, to 
remote client. This information is different from 
purpose to purpose. It is worth noting that the purpose 
enforcement information can be embedded in usage 
policy or can be expressed in a separate file. 
4.3 Ongoing-enforcement module 
This module is responsible for re-validating claimed 
purpose during usage session. It consists of the following 
components. 
1 Ongoing purpose validation point is responsible for re-
validating the purpose during the usage of data. With the 
information provided by purpose re-evaluation 
information module. It triggers the re-validation process 
periodically during the usage of data. If the claimed 
purpose is no longer valid given the change of time (or 
state) or other causes, this module informs DP to revoke 
the right and it ends the usage session. This module is also 
connected to purpose validation mechanisms. It is worth 
noting that both pre-enforcement and ongoing-enforcement 
may use the same validation mechanisms. The only 
difference is the phase at which the enforcement takes place. 
2 Purpose re-evaluation information module provides the 
information concerning when the ongoing-enforcement 
should take place and what are the validation 
mechanisms we should use. 
4.4 Post-enforcement module 
This module handles the evaluation of purpose after the 
usage of data. The decision of this module is based on the 
auditing result of the past usage activities against the usage 
policy and the relation of the claimed purpose with other 
purposes that have been granted in the past. In this paper, 
we do not go into the details of methods used to audit the 
usage of data; we leave it for the future work. 
1 Post purpose enforcement validation performs the 
validation of purpose after the usage of data. It 
communicates with the access history analyser to 
perform the analysing task of the past usage activities. 
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2 Access history analyser performs the auditing process 
on the usage history for a particularly data and its 
associate claimed purpose. If there is no violation of the 
usage policy, the positive response is sent to the post 
purpose enforcement point otherwise the negative 
response is sent. 
3 Usage history provides the selected information in 
database. The selected information means only the 
information relevant to the claimed purpose and target 
data that system is auditing. 
4 Purpose graph is a graph showing the inter-relationship 
between purposes. It is also called purpose tree. The 
intuition behind the use of purpose graph is that during 
the auditing process, we do not only examine the 
information related to claimed purpose, but also the 
information related to other purposes that have 
relationship with claimed purpose. This is because in 
some situation before achieving the claimed purpose, 
user may have to pass the intermediate states relating to 
other purposes and they have relationship with claimed 
purpose. With this information we can get to know the 
exact status of data processing and can make a 
knowledgeable decision. For more detail on how the 
purpose and purpose graph are modelled, one can refer 
to Rath and Colin (2013b). 
4.5 Information flow of the model 
This section presents a brief description of the data flow for 
the proposed model which is shown in Figure 2. It provides 
the overview of the communication between different 
components of the model. 
 (1) Subject sends ‘usage request’ to EP where the 
purpose of usage is mentioned. 
 (2) Upon receiving the usage request, EP retrieves  
the purpose of usage and sends the request to  
purpose validation point (pre-enforcement). If the 
purpose is valid, go to ‘(3)’, otherwise, the process is 
ended here (at EP) and the negative response is sent to 
subject. 
 (3) EP forwards the request to SMP. 
 (4) SMP sends the decision request to DP where the 
usage policy is evaluated. 
 (5) DP sends the decisions to SMP either positive or 
negative. If it is positive, the session starts. If it is 
negative, SMP simply forwards the decision to EP 
without starting the session. 
 (6) Upon receiving the positive response, EP allows 
user to use requested resource. 
Figure 3 Functioning of enforcement system (positive response), pre-enforcement 
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Figure 4 Functioning of enforcement system (positive response), ongoing-enforcement. Solid arrows represent the requests and dashed 
arrows represent responses 
5 Model implementation 
We designed a concrete usage control enforcement engine as 
presented in Figure 5. We then developed and tested a 
validation prototype in Java program. Furthermore, in order 
to utilise the existing standards and frameworks in the area of 
usage control, a modified XACML (enterprise-java-xacml, 
OASIS, 2013) Enterprise Java XACML is an implement of 
OASIS XACML 2.0 and intends to provide a high 
performance and good usability that can be used in enterprise 
environment, is used in this prototype as a core policy 
evaluation engine. Given that the usage enforcement should 
be done in a remote client platform, we have no control over 
the remote system. That requires trust establishment between 
the service provider and the remote client before any data are 
released. While the trust issue goes beyond the scope of this 
paper, we assume that the remote client is trusted before the 
usage control policy enforcement takes place. 
5.1 XACML (Extensible Access Control Markup 
Language) 
XACML is an OASIS standard that describes both the 
policy language and access control decision and response 
language. The policy language is, XML-based, used to 
describe the general access control requirements, while the 
access control decision request/response language aims at 
providing the means to form a query to ask whether or not a 
given action should be allowed or denied. The XACML 
policy language consists of three mains components: policy 
set, policy and rule. 
 Policy set contains the target, rule-combining algorithm, 
obligation and advice. Target specifies the set of requests 
to which it applies, it is generally declared by the policy 
writer. Rule-combining algorithm specifies the procedure 
by which the results of evaluating the policy are 
combined when evaluating the policy. Obligation 
specifies the obligation that user or system needs to 
perform before granting access to user. 
 Policy consists of the same components and they have 
the same functionality as that of policy set. Those 
components are target, rule-combining algorithm, 
obligation, and advice. 
 Rule consists of rule target, condition, obligation and 
advice. ‘Condition’ represents a Boolean expression that 
refines the applicability of the rule beyond the predicates 
implied by its target. Therefore, it may be absent. The 
condition attributes can be defined by the rule-writer. 
‘Advice’ may be added by the writer of the rule. When a 
PDP evaluates a rule containing advice expression, it 
evaluates the advice expressions into advice and returns 
certain of those advices to the PEP in the response 
context. Advice and obligation are different. Advice may 
be safely ignored by the PEP, while obligation is all 
time-compulsory task that needs to be executed by PEP. 
For more detail information, one can find it in XACML 
specification (OASIS, 2013). 
5.2 Prototype 
We prototype a remote client application for distributed 
healthcare system. This client application can control and 
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manage the usage of health record in accordance with the  
usage policy and the purpose enforcement information 
provided by source server. In our e-health scenario, the 
doctor requests patient’s health record from the Healthcare 
Information System (HIS). After authenticating and 
authorising the doctor based on his/her role and purpose of 
usage, HIS releases the record, usage policy, and purpose 
enforcement information in one package. The package can 
reside on doctor device for a specific period of time during 
which doctor can re-access/re-use it. The enforcement 
component, which is integrated into the document reader (at 
client side), checks the integrity of the package and extracts 
the usage control policy, purpose enforcement information 
and patient’s record. With those information, remote client 
application can control and manage the usage of record 
accordingly. Figure 5 shows the architecture of our usage 
control enforcement engine. 
 PEP acts as single entry point to protected resources. It 
performs usage control. It receives the usage requests 
from requester, and first makes a Purpose Validation 
Request (PVQ) and consequently receives the response 
(PVR) from PVP. After receiving the positive response 
from PVP, it makes a usage decision request (DQ) to 
PDP 1 and PDP 2 through SMP and gets the decision 
response (DR) either positive or negative. Then SMP 
forwards the response to PEP. PEP enforces the 
authorisation decisions it receives by either allowing 
access or denying it. 
 PVP acts as a validation point for purpose, which needs 
to be verified before further validation of the usage 
policy by PDP 1 and PDP 2. If PVP provides a negative 
response, the process ends and no further evaluation of 
usage policy. In case of positive response from PVP, a 
further decision request is sent to PDP 1 and PDP 2 
through SMP for further usage policy evaluation. 
 DP manages the decisions received from different decision 
modules such as: PDP1, PDP2 and PDP3. It then makes a 
final decision based on a specific algorithm. 
 Purpose enforcement information provides all the 
necessary information to PVP during the validation 
state. The information provided to PVP comes from 
different modules (Figure 2). Those modules are 
responsible for providing information for different 
types of purpose. For example, in case of emergency 
heart surgery purpose, the role to purpose alignment 
and medical treatment registration modules are the 
sources of information. 
 SMP is the dynamic part of the whole engine and 
captures the continuity behaviour of the usage control 
system. Furthermore, it manages the functions of other 
elements of the architecture and ensures the transitions 
from one to another state. 
 Event handler handles the events that trigger transitions 
from one state to another. It listens to the events and 
sends the trigger actions to SMP when state change is 
about to occur. 
 Timer can be set by the SMP through the event handler. 
Timer can be used for supporting re-evaluation process. 
 PVM is the purpose validation mechanism that is used 
to evaluate the authenticity of the claimed purpose. This 
module is used by two modules: PDP2 for ongoing-
enforcement and PVP for pre-enforcement. 
 PDP 1 refers to ADF function in our enforcement 
model and it is represented as a XACML PDP. It is the 
component that evaluates attribute-related constraints 
(authorisations and conditions) and renders decisions to 
SMP. 
 PDP 2 refers to OPE module of our enforcement model. 
It receives a re-evaluation request from the SMP and 
checks the re-evaluation rule from purpose ‘re-evaluation 
information’. It also renders decision to SMP. 
5.3 Design of purpose validation point for pre-
enforcement (PVP) 
Based on our proposed model, the pre-enforcement of 
claimed purpose needs to be performed by the system 
before the usage session starts. We build a Java package to 
represent it and integrate into the XACML policy engine. 
This module receives the claimed purpose from PEP and 
contacts the purpose validation mechanism for further 
validation process. The six validation mechanisms (Figure 2) 
are implemented as Java packages where the information 
concerning the alignment between purpose and role, 
purpose and data, etc., is expressed in XML file. 
PVP module provides two types of response: ‘Valid’ or 
‘Invalid’. They are expressed in XML file. ‘Valid’ means 
‘claimed purpose’ is valid and PEP can forward the request 
to SMP for further policy evaluation while ‘Invalid’ means 
otherwise. It is worth noting that with ‘Invalid’, the 
processing of request is ended immediately by PEP and no 
further evaluation of usage policy by DP. 
5.4 Design of ongoing purpose enforcement module 
We built two Java packages to represent OPE module, one 
called ‘Event Listener’ is responsible for listening to the 
request from SMP where the event handler is attached. 
Whenever, it receives the signal for re-evaluation of purpose, 
it triggers the re-evaluation module, which is the second Java 
package. Then the re-evaluation module contacts the purpose 
re-enforcement information for necessary information 
concerning the re-evaluation before contacting the purpose 
validation mechanism module to validate purpose. OPE 
module has also two possible responses, ‘Valid’ and 
‘Invalid’. ‘Valid’ means ‘claimed purpose’ is still valid and 
the usage of data can be continued as it is; while ‘Invalid’ 
means ‘claimed purpose’ is no longer valid. Thus, the system 
needs to interrupt the usage of data. The interruption is done 
by DP, after receiving the negative response from OPE, DP 
sends ‘permission deny’ to SMP and then SMP sends an alert 
message ‘ending usage session’ to PEP. Finally, PEP alerts 
the user about the decision. 
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Figure 5 Implementation architecture. Arrows represents the requests and responses between components in the system (see online 
version for colours) 
 
5.5 Design of the request structure 
The request structure is composed of the following 
components: (U, R, A, O, P) where 
1 ‘U’ is a user who requests for data usage. It can be 
identified by user’s name or identity. 
2 ‘R’ is a role of user in a particular institution. For 
example, cardiologist can be considered as user role. It 
is worth noting that in our implementation, we assume 
that user to role assignment is done by other modules 
and we do not address it here. 
3 ‘A’ is a requested action performing on resource or 
object. For example, transfer, copy, or read. 
4 ‘O’ is a targeted object by requester. 
5 ‘P’ is a claimed purpose, this is an important element in 
the request, user must declare their access purpose 
when initiating request. 
It is also worth noting that we adopt the XACML’s request 
structure in our implementation where the purpose of access is 
encoded in the environment attribute specified in standard 
XACML request. 
5.6 Design of purpose validation information 
Purpose validation information is the information provided 
to remote client application so that it can be used in purpose 
enforcement process. Those information are: ‘the purpose of 
access’, ‘validation phase’, ‘validation mechanism’ and 
‘time’. In our implementation, we express these information 
in xml file with the structure as presented in Figure 6. It is 
important to note that this structure is for the purpose of 
testing our model, it is not necessary a compete structure. 
5.7 Implementation and testing 
We built five components that form a usage control 
application. The first component is the document reader that  
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is responsible for processing the requested resource in the 
secure way. It also represents the PEP module. The second 
component is PVP. It is connected to the purpose validation 
mechanism. In our implementation, the six components of 
the purpose information point (role to purpose alignment, … 
refer to Figure 2) are encoded in XML format. 
Figure 6 Example of XML-based structure of purpose validation 
information (see online version for colours) 
 
The third component is the event handler, we use Java timer 
to set a time for triggering the event during the usage 
session. It is worth noting that ‘Timer’ acts upon the 
information from purpose enforcement information. The 
fourth component is the DP containing ADF and OPE. ADF 
module is based on the enterprise-java-xacml used for usage 
policy evaluation while OPE is for ongoing-enforcement. 
To test our application, we created different types of 
policies. Some require only pre-enforcement and some 
require both pre- and ongoing-enforcement. The purpose of 
usage is classified into two types: normal and emergency. In 
a normal case, pre-enforcement is required and all the six 
purpose validation modules (Figure 2, ranging from ‘action 
to purpose alignment’ to ‘medical treatment registration’, 
most importantly ‘consent/authorisation’) need to be 
checked. In emergency case, pre-enforcement is ignored 
while ongoing-enforcement and post-enforcement are 
required. It is worth noting that we use the emergency 
scenario because we want to show the important of the 
‘post-enforcement of purpose’. In general, ‘emergency 
usage’ is a special case where the pre-enforcement of 
purpose may not be possible because system may allow user 
to use data although they are not entitle to use it. This is 
because we need to balance between the risk of patient’s life 
and the safety of health record. 
6 Discussion and future work 
We proposed a general model for purpose enforcement 
applied for usage control in distributed healthcare. The 
model covers all the necessary functionalities for enforcing 
purpose of usage in different phases during the data usage 
lifecycle. If we go into the details of the model, we see 
clearly that the security of data depends largely on the 
effectiveness of the purpose validation mechanism. How to 
design a very effective validation mechanism that can be 
used for all types of purpose is still a question. This is 
because, in most cases, it is hard to verify if the purpose of 
usage can be achieved or not with a 100% sure decision as 
some purposes can be validated only either instantly or a 
while after the data usage. For example, ‘accessing patient’s 
record for the purpose of research’, how to ensure that user 
uses those records for research, only after a certain period of 
time, we can conclude whether user has used those records 
for research purpose or not. Thus, the need of probabilistic 
approach. Our future research is to work on a type of 
purpose engine that is able to predict the future achievement 
of claimed purpose based on the historical usage activities 
of user, contextual knowledge related to claimed purpose, 
and relationship between claimed purpose and other 
purposes. This approach will leverage the security and make 
a more reliable purpose enforcement engine. 
7 Conclusion 
In this paper, we addressed the issue of purpose enforcement 
in usage control, applied to e-health domain as an illustration. 
We proposed a classification for enforcement mechanisms, 
based on the moment that happen in the usage timeline and 
defined pre-, ongoing-, and post-enforcement. Building on 
this classification, we proposed an original model for purpose 
enforcement, as well as a system architecture that introduced 
some generic components that contribute to the enforcement 
of usage purpose. A prototype of the model has been 
developed as a first step into validation. In this paper, we only 
dealt with the pre- and ongoing-enforcement cases while 
post-enforcement is left for the future work. 
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